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III.2.2.2 Interconnection
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According to the definition given in section III.2.2, interconnection services are considered to be, in particular, the establishment of the physical network connection as well as termination, origination and transit of calls. In the following examples these types of traffic shall be demonstrated: a customer (subscriber A) connected to network 1 calls a customer (subscriber B) of network 4 via a carrier network (10xx of network 2). In this case
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The carrier network (network 2) bills the end-user and shall compensate the other operators for the interconnection services.
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III.2.2.2.1 The legal framework for interconnection The European regulatory framework imposes on operators with significant market power an extensive obligation for interconnection, whose concrete final formulation is left to the legislator of the Member State. The Interconnection Directive (directive 97/33/EC as amended by 98/61/EG), in particular, emphasises that fair, proportionate and non-discriminatory conditions for interconnection and interoperability are "key factors in fostering the development of open and competitive markets". Interconnection does not least ensure that, due to the availability of all subscribers of all networks, positive network externalities can be utilised. Apart from the regulatory complex of sector-specific Directives, of course, also the general rules on competition of European law (i.e. in particular Art. 81, 82 and 85 EC Treaty) are applicable to network access and interconnection issues. The physical and logical linking of the networks required under European law is ensured in TKG by special provisions for network access in the form of interconnection. The basic provision with regard to network access is contained in Art. 37. Accordingly, an operator of a telecommunications network who offers public telecommunications services and has significant market power shall make it possible for other users to access his telecommunications network or unbundled parts thereof. Pursuant to Art. 37 (2) TKG, network access shall be granted via connections that are in general demand on the market ("general network access"). However, network access can be also granted via special connections ("special network access"). Whereas Art. 37 (1) TKG imposes on the operator with significant market power the obligation to grant access to his network or unbundled parts thereof, Art. 41 (1) TKG imposes on all operators of public telecommunications networks (not only on those with significant market power) the obligation to make an interconnection offer to other operators of such networks. If the operators do not reach an agreement within the minimum negotiation period of six weeks required by law, each may bring the case before TKK (Art. 111 TKG). It is a prerequisite for such recourse that within a period of six weeks as of receipt of the request (for network access) no agreement on interconnection (either in total or only in some points) has been reached. Then, TKK shall decide on the interconnection within a period of six weeks (which may be extended to ten weeks). This decision will supersede the agreement under private law. The framework under substantive law which TKK has to take into account in its decisions is based on:
The scope of interconnection is defined in Art. 38 TKG as well as in Art. 3 Z 7 and 16 TKG (see also Info Box 11). With interconnection the functional component is of paramount importance, aiming at ensuring a functioning end-to-end communication between the users of different networks. Art. 38 TKG further defines the scope of interconnection which shall comprise at least the following services:
The interconnection charges applying in connection with these services as well as the charges for access to the unbundled local loop shall be determined according to the principle of cost orientation on the basis of the costs of an efficient network operator (Forward Looking Long Run Average Incremental Costs - FL-LRAIC), as required by law (Art. 41 (3) TKG and Art. 8f ZVO).
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Since this approach is of particular importance, it will
be explained in greater detail in a separate chapter (see section
III.2.2.2.2)
Especially since the field of interconnection charges is of particular importance for the development of competition in telecommunications, the European Commission has been conducting benchmark studies on the amounts of the charges on a regular basis since 1997. The results of the studies are published by the EU Commission (see Fig. 34). |
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| III.2.2 Open Network Provision | III.2.2.2.2 Demands on cost accounting systems | |||||||||||